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This paper attempts to answer the following question: How, in economic terms, was
being colonized by Portugal “different” for Lusophone African countries than was being
colonized by France or Britain?  Gervase Clarence-Smith addressed this question for the period
after 1825, and comes to the conclusion that Portuguese economic motivations were much the
same as those for other colonial powers.  Nevertheless, this leaves open the question of whether
the objective conditions of Portugal’s economy and its development trajectory over the long run
(i.e. from the 15th century on)  may have affected its colonial relations regardless of whether
motivations were the same.  
The answer to this question is examined in terms of Portugal’s own lack of economic
development and the economic processes which led to this.  Most important is the fact that
Portugal experienced a massive influx of foreign exchange (gold and revenue from the spice
trade) during a period when other Northern European countries were undergoing the beginnings
of the Industrial Revolution and the consequent transformations in their economies that this
engendered.  Portugal, however, never underwent these changes until the twentieth century, due
at least in part to what is commonly called “Dutch Disease” in the economics literature, a name
for a pattern of problems afflicting resource rich countries which distorts their development and
retards the growth of productive sectors of the economy.  Portuguese colonies were consequently
involved in this syndrome in much the same manner that outlying provinces of modern-day
resource exporting countries are.    This syndrome is consistent with the parasitical nature of
Portuguese exploitation during much of the colonial era, and particularly with the powerful need
of Portugal to derive foreign exchange earnings from its colonies after the end of the gold and
spice boom.   Even so, it is difficult to conclude that Lusophone Africa was in fact worse off than
its neighbors during most of the colonial era.  However, the lack of development of Portugal
3itself can be seen as a powerful motivation for the pattern of settlement and exploitation of
Portuguese Africa in the twentieth century, in that the large “exports” of unskilled labor and
virtually complete marginalization of African populations from even menial labor in many
instances was both more extreme than in other parts of Africa and a result of the inability of
Portugal’s own undeveloped economy to provide sufficient productive opportunities by itself. 
Also in this vein, Portugal’s resistance to decolonization until the mid-1970's can also be viewed
as stemming at least partially from the lack of development in Portugal itself.
In the final analysis, it must be acknowledged that even though Dutch Disease analysis is
a useful construct for aiding understanding of the long run economic processes at work in
Portugal during the colonial era, it cannot be argued that this was the sole or even necessarily the
primary causal factor at work.  Other plausible hypotheses are possible, and at the end of the day
we are left with a chicken-and-egg problem if any attempt is made to assign priority to one
hypothesis over another.  The paper concludes that even though no one theory of causality can be
defended, we must admit that available evidence is, perhaps unfortunately for academics, capable
of supporting multiple causal processes, and understanding this, and the relations between them
can help us to a more accurate vision of history.
1 Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975, Manchester
University Press, 1985.
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Portugal and the Curse of Riches
Macro Distortions and Underdevelopment in Colonial Times
I. Introduction
Much of the current research and literature on the relations between Portugal and Africa
is focused on a micro level analysis of the interactions between the colonialist Europeans and the
African populations who were exploited by them.  While this area of research is important and
gives insights which can be gained in no other way, it is nevertheless also true that the economic
changes brought about by this exploitation caused Portugal’s own trajectory of economic and
social development to be distorted and biased and that this in turn had an effect on colonial
relations and the colonies themselves.
Gervase Clarence-Smith addresses the issue of Portuguese exceptionalism in economic
colonial relations in his 1985 book The Third Portuguese Empire 1825-1975 in which he
portrays Portuguese colonial motivations as essentially identical to those of other European
powers - a search for markets and an effort to secure sources of raw materials.1  However, even if
we accept this analysis there remains the open question of whether Portuguese colonial relations
were nevertheless conditioned by the extent and nature of Portugal’s own economic development
over the whole colonial period from the late 15th century until 1975.  That is, if Portugal’s own
development was distorted, this may well have affected the colonies even though motivations
may have been the same as those of e.g. Britain or France.  This paper comes to a somewhat
mixed conclusion: While it is relatively clear that a case can be made for the existence of such
macroeconomic distortions, it is much more difficult to prove that these had such a profound
effect on Lusophone Africa as to support a case for Portuguese exceptionalism along the lines of
2 The effects of the inflow of gold on the economy of Europe has been studied,
particularly in the case of the effects of Spanish colonial silver on European price trends. This
paper extends the analysis in two directions.  First, it looks closely at the case of Portugal. 
Second, it extends the analysis to its predictions for the effects on the direction of economic
development in those parts of the empire outside of the center, i.e. the hinterland of Portugal and
the colonies themselves.
3    This is based on estimates of about 170,000 dobras of gold from El Mina, an
additional 30,000 from Axim, and about 9,000 from the Sierra Leone area.  Using the exchange
rate of 50 dobras per mark this is translates to 130,000 sterling.  See Bean, R. “A Note on the
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what has been commonly argued in the past.  Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that these distortions must have had some effect on colonial relations and that an understanding
of them may help us to understand the nature of Portugal’s relations with its colonies and support
some more speculative, but still interesting, observations about the colonization and economic
development of Lusophone Africa.
II. Portuguese Expansion and the Curse of Riches
In essence, these distortions stemmed from the very success of the Portuguese efforts to
exploit the new colonies that they acquired and the riches that were extracted from them and
returned to Lisbon.  Indeed, this was the entire raison d’etre of the Portuguese colonial project in
the first place - efforts to colonize in the 1400's and later were better characterized at efforts to
either cart off riches such as gold, ivory and slaves or, if military superiority could not be brought
to bear, to trade for these items so that they could be brought back to Lisbon and used to support
the expenditures of the crown and of the nobility.  Early efforts met with success.  The
Portuguese succeeded in trading for gold in West Africa, (given their inability to conquer the
well-organized kingdoms of Mali and Ghana) and were also successful in promoting a large trade
in slaves from other parts of Africa to the islands of Sno TomJ e PrRncipe as well as the Gold
Coast and also to Portugal itself.2 
During the 16th century, it is estimated that as much as 130,000 pounds sterling (1601
standard) of gold was sent to Portugal each year from Africa3, a massive sum at a time when
Relative Importance of Slaves and Gold in West African Exports” Journal of African History
15:3 (1974)  pp. 351-356. See also James Duffy Portugal in Africa Penguin Books, 1963 p 35.
4 See Vitorino Magalhnes-Godinho, L’Economie de L’Empire Portugais aux XV et XVI
Siecles, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1969 and Philip C. Curtin “Africa and the Wider
Monetary World 1250-1850" in Richards, ed. Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early
Modern Worlds Carolina Academic Press, 1983.
5 Vogt estimates that privately smuggled gold amounted to as much as 23% of officially
transported gold.  See John Vogt Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast 1469-1682 University of
Georgia Press 1979 pp. 65-66.
6 See Boxer, op. cit. p 31.
7 A quintal is equivalent to 51.4 kg.
8 See Boxer, op. cit. pp. 59-60.
9 It was reported by Gaspar Correia that pepper prices tripled from 1520-1560. See
Armando Castro, Historia Economica de Portugal Editorial Caminho 1985, p.108.
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average per capita income of the working classes would have been on a par with subsistence
farmers in many parts of Africa today.  It has been estimated that approximately 700 kg/yr were
imported from West Africa to Portugal through the 1500's, though only half or less was
channeled through the royal mint in Lisbon4. (See Tables 1, 2 and 3).  Much of the remainder
was brought in on private account, or smuggled by individuals5.  The Portuguese origin of much
of the gold in circulation in northern Europe is attested to not only by the fact that many of the
coins in circulation were in fact minted in Lisbon, but also that certain gold coins were referred
to as “Portugaloisers” in northern Europe even centuries later.6
In addition to gold imports, success in the spice trade brought huge riches as well, as did
mineral discoveries in Brazil in this and later centuries together with exports of sugar.  In the
16th century, spices were of particular importance, with imports estimated at upwards of 40,000
quintals7 during the first third of the 16th century and between 60,000 and 70,000 later on.8 
During the second half of this century consumption of spices in Europe doubled while prices also
increased by about 100-200%.9  About a third of this typically consisted of pepper, with mace,
nutmeg cloves and cinnamon accounting for most of the rest.
10  See Vitorino Godinho Magalhnes Mito e Mercadoria, Utopia e Pratica de Navegar
Difusão Editorial 1990,  especially Chapter 12.  See also B. W.  Diffie and G. D. Winius,
Foundations of the Portuguese Empire 1415-1580 University of Minnesota Press, 1977, p. 205.
11 See Castro, op. cit. p. 113 and 128.
12 See Castro, op. cit. p. 140.
7
The profits from the spice trade were spectacular and played a large part in luring the
Portuguese adventurers (and the Crown which financed their voyages) around the Cape of Good
Hope in search of a direct route to the Spice Islands.  Spices which sold for 2 ½ - 3 ducats in
Calicut could be resold in Cairo for as much as 68.10  While pepper was by far the most important
in terms of volume, the so-called “luxury” spices of cloves, nutmeg and mace were far more
valuable in terms of price for a given weight.  This led to an intense drive to dominate the few
small islands where these were produced, which the Portuguese succeeded in doing until the
Dutch took over in the 1600's.  It has been estimated that the total of spice imports by the
Portuguese in the early 16th centuries amounted to between 1600 and 2450 metric tons, worth at
least about a million cruzados, or about double the value of gold from Africa and very little of
which was consumed in Portugal itself, instead being transshipped to other European ports in
exchange for other goods.11
How then, did the amounts gained from the gold and spice trade compare with overall
economic activity?  While any estimates of Gross Domestic Product are of necessity much more
approximate than are estimates of the value of gold and spices (for which accounting was
performed at the time and for which records exist), it is still very instructive to look at the orders
of magnitude involved.  Armando Castro, an economic historian, has formulated estimates of
GDP in Portugal in the 16th century and has come up with the following figures based on
estimates of the production of the principal products and their prices at the time12:
GDP of metropolitan Portugal -        Between 9,630, 000 and 14, 445, 000 cruzados
Gross Product of Overseas Activities - Between 1, 600, 000 and  7, 700, 000 cruzados
13 See Alan Gelb ed. Oil Windfalls:  Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press 1988, p.
62.  The figures cited are for the 1974-78 period.
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It can be seen that the value of the foreign exchange inflow from these new products was
somewhere between about 10% and more than 44% of GDP, or between  11% and 80% of the
GDP of the metropolitan economy of Portugal.  This represents a massive inflow of foreign
exchange, and in general magnitude is of the same order as the windfalls experienced by oil
exporting countries in the 20th century.  The table below shows the magnitude of oil shocks in
countries widely cited as suffering from “Dutch Disease” in the modern era13:
Country Oil Windfall as % of Non-Mining GDP
Algeria 27.1%
Ecuador 16.8%
Indonesia 15.9%
Nigeria 22.8%
Trinidad & Tobago 38.9%
Venezuela 10.8%
While it is perhaps tempting to count the slave trade as another source of foreign
exchange, there are good reasons for not doing so during the early years of Portuguese
colonialism prior to the 1600's.  Essentially, the slave trade at this time was far less important to
the metropolitan economy than was trade in gold and spices, though it came to be more
important in the latter part of the 17th  century and in the 18th as gold declined (other countries
having taken over the majority of the West African gold trade) and the numbers of slaves
exported increased.  However, during the 15th and 16th centuries, about 3-4000 slaves per year
were taken by the Portuguese from Benin, the Congo and Angola areas, but most of these went to
other parts of Africa or to São Tomé rather than to Portugal itself.  Indeed, slaves became an
important import to West African gold areas as labor to work the mines was in high demand by
14  See Vogt, J Portuguese Rule on the gold Coast 1469-1682 University of Georgia
Press, 1979, pp. 71-73.  See also Bean, R. “A Note on the Relative Importance of Slaves and
Gold in West African Exports” Journal of African History 15:3 (1974)  pp. 351-356
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interior kingdoms at that time.14
III.  The Effects of a Large Inflow of Gold
The massive inflow of  gold and goods readily transformed into gold (amounting to
somewhere between 10 and 44% of  GDP) caused distortions typical of mineral exporting
economies, and commonly known as "Dutch Disease".   This term refers to the problems of
exchange rate overvaluation and relative price distortions that result in strong urban bias and
stagnation of non-mineral exports and import competing sectors.   The activities most adversely
affected are those most exposed to competition from abroad, in the case of Portugal, agriculture
and light manufacturing and agro-processing sectors which were replaced by imports in the large
urban markets on the coast.  
The applicability of this analysis to the case of Portugal during its colonial expansion is
clear.  Portugal, as noted in Chapter 1, was a country with extremely poorly developed
infrastructure such as roads, and poorly developed links between Lisbon and the interior of the
country.  
It is interesting to note that the period of the 1600's through the 1800's saw the beginnings
of the transformation of northern European economies from the mainly agricultural base of the
late medieval and early Renaissance periods into the more modern agricultural and pre-industrial
patterns typified by the industrial Revolution in England and elsewhere.  That Portugal did not
go through these same transformations can be attributed to the effects of large amounts of gold
(the “foreign exchange” of this period) which obviated the need to develop these activities
domestically.  Thus, the agricultural and industrial revolutions which characterized economic
development in other parts of Europe did not occur in Portugal, which imported the cheaper
15 This discussion draws on Corden, W, Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: 
Survey and Consolidation Oxford Economics Papers 36 (1984) 359-380 and Alan Gelb et. al. Oil
Windfalls:  Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press 1988.
16 Summarized in Bordo MD John Cairnes on the Effects of the Australian Gold
Discoveries 1851-73 History of Political Economy 3 (1975) 337-359.
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manufactures that were available as a result of these transformations elsewhere.
In fact, not only did easy money obviate the need to develop these activities, but provided
a strong disincentive to do so.  This is due to what the modern analysis would call
“overvaluation” of the exchange rate, or in more basic terms a distortion of the relative price of
foreign exchange which makes it cheaper in local currency.  The net effect of cheap foreign
exchange is to make imported goods look cheap and this in turn discourages any domestic effort
to compete with them.   The end result is an economy which relies on its foreign exchange
producing activity to generate the money needed to import necessities while skewing incentives
against producing them at home. 
A Brief Analysis of the Effects of Large Foreign Exchange Inflows15
The effects of large foreign exchange inflows on those parts of the economy not directly
related to the sector that is producing the riches dates from a discussion by Cairnes in 1857 of the
effects of the Australian gold rush16 and has been of more direct interest in modern times in the
analysis of the effects of large oil discoveries on the economies of oil exporters.  The relevance
of this to the case of Angola in the last quarter century is obvious, but it is also relevant to the
case of Portugal in colonial times since the key to the analysis is the problem of absorbing large
windfalls of foreign exchange, from whatever source.  In modern times oil and diamonds are the
most extreme examples of this, but large gold discoveries can be equally as problematic since
they are not just convertible into hard currency, but in fact already are hard currency or at least
could be treated as such as soon as they were processed into metal after mining.
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The fact that gold was itself the hard currency of the day from the early colonial period
right through the 1800's means that when we speak of “exchange rate distortions” we cannot use
the term in the same way that we do in modern times when we are referring to the relationship
between the price of a nation’s currency in terms of another nation’s currency or gold.  Rather,
we must focus on the relationship between the price of gold (which is itself “foreign exchange”)
and other prices in the economy.  More particularly, we are most interested in the relative prices
of “traded goods” and those which are non-traded.
Traded goods consist of all those items which are or have the potential to be traded
internationally including both exports and imports for any given country.  Obvious candidates
are commodities such as wheat, wine or other easily transportable agricultural output,
manufactures such as cloth or metal goods such as firearms or utensils of various types.  The key
characteristic regarding traded goods is that their prices are fixed by international markets by
virtue of the fact that they can be traded - If, for example, the price of wheat were to start to rise
in Portugal then it would pay for English exporters to send some wheat there to take advantage of
the new market conditions, thereby increasing the supply and preventing the incipient price rise. 
The same reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandum to the wheat market in England.  If prices
there were to try to fall, then it would pay to export wheat rather than keeping it for sale in the
domestic market, thus preventing the incipient price decline.  Thus, prices of these items are not
determined by domestic market conditions - rather, the quantity adjusts (via changes in exports
or imports) - and are instead determined by world market conditions in the aggregate.  In the case
of Portugal in colonial times or of former Portuguese colonies now, the relative size of the
domestic economy compared to the aggregate world market is quite small  meaning that
domestic market developments have no detectable effect on world prices.
Non-traded goods consist of all those items which cannot be traded internationally, or for
which there are substantial barriers to such trade.  Obvious candidates are housing, or personal
services, which are of necessity produced at the point of consumption.  The traditional example
of this last category is a haircut, the price of which varies widely across borders since the demand
and supply are essentially local phenomena and not subject to foreign influence since noone
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crosses borders for the purpose of giving or getting a haircut.  The key characteristic of non-
traded goods markets which distinguishes them from traded goods is that incipient changes in
supply and demand are of necessity equilibrated by changes in price  rather than quantity since if
these goods are not traded internationally, there can be no quantity adjustment via exports or
imports.
The relative price of traded and non traded goods in the economy is what
macroeconomists refer to as the “real exchange rate”, usually expressed as the price of traded
goods divided by the price of non traded goods:  PT/PNT.  In other words, it is the amount of
traded goods that one can exchange for a given amount of non-traded goods.  This relative price
is of vital importance in determining the composition of both consumption and consumption in
the economy in general.  Two propositions hold:
1.  The higher (lower) the real exchange rate, the more (less) expensive traded goods are in
relation to non-traded goods, so that more (less) will tend to be produced.  This additional
(lesser)  production of both export goods, and of goods that would otherwise be imported will
tend to increase (decrease) the surplus in the balance of payments.
2.  The higher (lower) the real exchange rate, the more (less) expensive traded goods are in
relation to non-traded goods, so that more less (more) will tend to be consumed.  This decreased
(increased) consumption of both export goods, and of goods that would otherwise be imported
will tend to decrease (increase) the surplus in the balance of payments.
The upshot of this is that the real exchange rate is of fundamental importance to an
economy’s external balance - The higher it is the bigger the surplus on the balance of payments
is, both because of increased production and decreased consumption of traded goods as
compared to non-traded ones.  It is also of key importance to internal balance as can be
illustrated by considering the effects of a shock to the economy when large foreign exchange
inflows occur.
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 Initially the effects of such an inflow depend on what the money is spent on.  Insofar as
the money is spent on traded goods, we can say two things:
-  Relative prices do not change if money is spent on imported goods or goods that could have
been exported.  Instead, there will simply be a bigger deficit in the balance of payments or a
smaller surplus.
- Given that there is no change in prices, there is no change in incentives for production or
consumption, hence the structure of the economy does not otherwise change.
However, there is a very different outcome insofar as the money is spent on non-traded
goods.  Here, we can trace through the following effects:
- As a first round effect, money spent on non-traded goods will cause their price to go up (or in
other words the real exchange rate, PT/PNT, will fall).  This results in inflation.
- Second, producers and consumers respond to the new relative prices in the following ways:
Producers see that non-taxables are now relatively higher priced than are taxables and so 
will tend to switch production from taxables to non-taxables.
Consumers also see more expensive non-taxables and so respond by consuming less of
them and more taxables.
Both of these reactions tend to worsen the balance of payments.
- Third, future investment and resource flows will follow the changes in production.  Apart from
the sector that is producing the windfall, both capital and labor will tend to migrate toward the
sector where production is increasing and away from the one where it is decreasing.  This means
that resources will tend to flow out of the traded goods sectors and into the sectors producing
17 Based on Corden, op. cit.
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non-traded goods.
Figure 117 illustrates these changes.  There are three sectors of interest.  The Booming
Sector (B), which is the one producing the windfall, be it oil or gold or some other good, the
Lagging Sector, (L) which produces tradable goods other than those from the Booming Sector,
and the Non-Tradable Sector (N).  Figure 1 shows the effects of a foreign exchange windfall on
the N sector.
As discussed above, the first round of effects depends on how the windfall is spent.  If
some part of it ends up being spent on non-traded goods, either directly by beneficiaries of the
windfall buying mansions, hiring servants or via government taxation or appropriation and
funding of non-traded spending, then there will be a consequent increase in demand for N goods,
leading to rightward shift of the demand curve for N goods to D1.  Depending on the elasticities
of supply and demand there will be some combination of increased output of N and increased
prices of N goods, which leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  This will tend to
draw resources out of both B and L into N and to shift demand away from N and toward B and L. 
However, if B is indeed producing windfalls of sufficient magnitude to generate large macro
effects, the resource movement effect will fall principally on the L sector.
There are further resource movement effects which are also shown in Figure 1.  First, the
B sector will tend to attract labor and capital from both L and N.  This will result in a decrease in
output in L (not shown in figure) as well as a decrease in the output of N goods.  This last result
is shown by the shift of the supply curve to S1, with still higher prices for N goods and
consequent shift to the left of the equilibrium output for N.
If there is mobility of labor as well as capital, then we can expect a migration of labor
toward those centers at which expenditure of the windfall is concentrated (typically capital cities
in the case of government appropriated windfalls).  This migration induced a further spending
15
effect which, insofar as it falls on N goods, causes an additional rightward shift of the demand
curve to D2 with additional appreciation of the real exchange rate and a further round of effects as
described above.
The lessons of this analysis are clear:  Large inflows of foreign exchange, be they from
oil,  gold, or other sources, have the capacity to seriously distort economies by suppressing the
growth of other sectors while facilitating the growth of a rentier class which lives off of the
revenue stream produced by the foreign exchange generating activity.  Investment in such an
economy tends to be directed toward further expansion of this activity, whatever it is, as well as
toward those sectors which help to dispose of the windfall.  Typically, this would be trading, as
well as a spectrum of service sectors aimed at supporting the consumption activities of the rentier
class.
All of this is sustainable only so long as the foreign exchange windfall continues.  Serious
problems arise when the stream of easy money comes to a halt.  The economy is then left with no
source of foreign exchange and a stunted growth of all other productive sectors which is
exacerbated by the typical failure to invest any of the windfall in the public infrastructure needed
to support a diversified set of other activities.  The center of such an economy, the capital city,
enjoys an initial burst of activity as inflows of revenue fund large public works projects and the
rentier class’ consumption fuels a construction boom.  Outlying areas are depressed as they not
only do not enjoy the public expenditures of the center, but also are host to economic sectors
which contract in the face of cheap import competition.  In addition, the pull of resources (both
labor and capital) out of these areas and into the sector producing the windfall gives further
impetus to the downward spiral of economic activity away from the center.
Even those areas which are home to the activity producing the windfall do not enjoy a
widespread or sustainable pattern of growth.  With investment concentrated in only one activity,
others wither except insofar as they can help fuel the expenditures which the large revenues
generate.  Examples of such local economies are found in oil producing areas in the modern age
18 It should be noted that the California gold rush, though typical of mineral economies,
was neither integrated enough into the economy of the Eastern US nor was it large enough
compared to it to cause some of the “center” or capital city effects identified above.  It remains,
however, quite typical of the distorted development of booming areas themselves.
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or in gold rush economies of the 19th century in such areas as California or the Yukon18.  As with
the capital city, such areas do not enjoy a prosperity which survives the exhaustion of the
resource upon which they are based and see a pattern of investment and infrastructure
development geared almost exclusively toward the extractive activity they are centered on.
An additional effect is often present in cases where capital is internationally mobile.  As
domestic prices inflate, interest rates on foreign capital look cheaper and cheaper at a given
exchange rate.  This stimulates foreign borrowing to support consumption and/or investment
beyond that which can be supported by mineral rents alone.  This effect helps to explain the 
apparently perverse situation of many oil countries where huge foreign exchange windfalls are
accompanied by huge foreign debts.
III.  Application of Dutch Disease Analysis to Portuguese Colonial Relations
In the case of Portuguese colonialism, (and confining the analysis to the period prior to
the early 1600's)  it is clear that Lisbon and the Royal court constitute the “center” of the above
analysis, while the hinterland of Portugal constitutes an area where economic activities are
depressed due to competition from imports and starvation of necessary resources as investment
funds are directed elsewhere and labor is drawn away to provide services to the wealthy rentier
class in Lisbon and to work in the colonizing project which generated the windfall of gold.  In
the case of Portugal, the urbanizing tendencies of Lisbon are clear, as is the extent to which
Lisbon was an outward looking city, emphasizing trade with colonies (the revenue generating
activity) and trade with countries supplying imports (English wheat and textiles) to the exclusion
of linkages with its own outlying areas.
19 See Anderson, J. History of Portugal Greenwood Press, 2000, p. 80-82.
20 See Boxer, op. cit. p 174.
21  See Castro op. cit. pp. 129-132 for a discussion of the lack of development of the
domestic economy during this period.  See also E. Mata and N Valerio Historia Economica de
Portugal Editorial Presenca, 1993, pp. 93-94.
22 See Anderson, op. cit. page 80
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For example, during the reign of Joao III (1521-1580), it is reported that the main grain
producing area for Lisbon, the Alentejo, declined steadily, with the wheat farms either worked by
slaves or not at all.  In the north peasants left to look for work in the large towns or shipped out
to the east looking for riches.  In addition, Lisbon grew rapidly during this time in response to the
concentration of trade there resulting from the royal monopoly on trade with the colonies, to the
detriment of other coastal towns.  Lisbon, rather than being a center of industrial development,
was at this time a center for consumption by the nobility and a way station for transshipment of
colonial goods to other European ports such as Antwerp better situated for distribution.19
Further evidence of the lack of investment in non-booming sectors in Portugal is the
“execrable” state of the roads, which as late as the end of the 1700's were characterized as
“appalling even by 18th century standards”.  An Italian visitor is reported to have observed that it
was easer to find at Lisbon a ship bound for Goa or Brazil than a carriage to Porto or Braga.20
Overall, the economy of 16th century metropolitan Portugal did not expand much at all
outside of industries directly related to the colonial enterprise such as ship building and related
industries and arms.  Even industries for which there was a domestic demand, such as textiles,
failed to develop as it was “easier” to simply buy them with the proceeds of gold and spice
trade.21  
The drain of manpower out of Portugal into ships and colonies is evidenced by reports
which state that in the first half of the 16th century about 472 ships left for the East carrying
about 180,000 men, most of whom never returned.22  It has been estimated that about 2,400 men
23 See, for example, Boxer, C. The Portuguese Seaborne Empire Knopf, 1969, pp. 52-54.
24 See A J R Russell-Wood A World On the Move:  The Portuguese in Africa, Asia and
America, 1415-1808 St. Martin’s Press 1993 pp. 124-125.  For a discussion of this “resource
movement effect” in Dutch Disease economies, see Corden op. cit. pp360-361.
25 See Boxer op. cit. pp. 326-327.
26 See Mata and Valerio op. cit.  pp. 100-101. See also Anderson op. cit. p. 79.
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left Portugal each year during the this century, out of a total population numbering somewhere
between 1 and 1.4 million.  Though the small number of women among emigrants meant that the
natural rate of growth of the population was not seriously affected, the continuing emigration of
able bodied men resulted in a lack of labor which left many agricultural areas either undeveloped
or underused.23  This underdevelopment of a traded sector through drainage of manpower to the
booming sector is a typical characteristic of a Dutch Disease economy, and is further evidenced
by the large imports of wheat from other parts of Europe including Britain, Flanders and
France.24
That the expenditure patterns of the rentier class were biased toward consumption and
construction rather than investment in productive activities can be seen today in the magnificent
castles and palaces built in Cintra and Mafra, among others, as well as in the many manor houses
and beautiful country residences dotting the countryside around Lisbon.  Most returnees from the
colonies who amassed fortunes of any size did not invest them in commercial enterprises, instead
using them to purchase houses, land and the formation of estates.25
In fact, Portugal suffered from a syndrome common to many oil countries today in that
the crown amassed huge debts to foreign bankers to support consumption well beyond that which
could be financed by overseas activities alone.  The first emission of public debt was made in
1500 and by the middle of the century it amounted to 1500 contos, or well over 400% of annual
receipts by the state.  In 1560 the first suspension of payments occurred, the first in a long history
of debt difficulties.26
27 In fact, one of the main reasons for the settlement of Cabo Verde was to produce cotton
and cloth for the gold trade in Guinea since Portugal lacked domestic sources for these goods. 
The cloth was produced largely by African artisans to African specifications, with the Portuguese
providing large scale management and transport.  See Eugenia Herbert, “Portuguese Adaptation
to Trade Patterns Guinea to Angola (1443-1640)” African Studies Review Vol. 17 No. 2 (Sept.
1974) pp. 411-424.
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What does this analysis mean for the colonies?  First of all, it must be recognized that
insofar as was possible, the Portuguese tried to monopolize commerce in their colonies to the
maximum extent possible.  That is, they tried to make their colonies and Portugal itself into one
economic unit vis a vis the rest of the world.  This had the effect (to the extent that it was
successful) of cementing the economic development of the colonies into the patterns of foreign
exchange dependence noted above.  What does the analysis say about these areas?
First, those areas which are home to the extractive activities which generate the foreign
exchange tend to be geared solely to this end, with all economic activity directed either toward
extraction or toward servicing the consumption patterns of the extractors.  This pattern is
exacerbated by the direction of infrastructural development which, insofar as it proceeds at all, is
aimed solely at promoting the extraction.
This is illustrated by the placement of Portuguese settlements in Africa both initially and
as time went on.  The first outposts were on the West African coast and were placed so as to
facilitate access to the gold mines that are located in what is now Ghana.  Indeed, the very name
of this fort, El Mina, means “The Mine”.  Clearly, this was directly related to extractive
activities, and in fact was not directed toward any other goal.  Initially, the Portuguese attempted
to subjugate the gold mines to direct control but were defeated by the well organized armies of
the kingdoms in the interior.  Subsequent trading activities were aimed directly at trading for
gold, first in exchange for cloth and other manufactures27 and later in exchange for slaves which
were needed to work the mines.   
Subsequent outposts down the Atlantic coast of Africa were similarly geared toward
extractive activities, though these were aimed more at acquiring slaves for the Guinea gold trade
28 See Boxer, op. cit. pp. 99-102.
29 See J. Vansina  “Long distance trade routes in central Africa” Journal of African
History 3:3  (1962) pp. 375-390, Bean, R. “A Note on the Relative Importance of Slaves and
Gold in West African Exports” Journal of African History 15:3 (1974)  pp. 351-356, as well as
Boxer op. cit. pp. 98-102 .
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than at gold directly.  Sao Tome became a principal entrepot for the north-south slave trade in the
early years and for the transatlantic trade later on.  São Tomé and Principe were also important
for sugar production in the sixteenth century, though this later moved to the Northeast of Brazil.
Further south in the Congo and Angola, the Portuguese first attempted to Christianize and 
establish relations with the existing power, the king of the Congo tribe. While the mani kongo
Afonso I (1506-43) was a devout Catholic who genuinely attempted to christianize his people,
his efforts never bore fruit for two basic reasons.  First, the Portuguese throne never regarded his
requests as important enough to devote sufficient resources to do the job, often taking years to
answer communications from him and never sending enough missionaries.28  Second, the
missionaries themselves as well as other Portuguese in the area rapidly became deeply involved
in the slave trade.  Annual exports from the kingdom amounted to 4-5,000 peHas annually, a
number which understates the number of people involved since a peHa was counted as the
equivalent of a prime male slave, with others either younger, older, or female counting as some
fraction of a peHa.   
At first, most slaves were obtained through the Congo kingdom from surrounding
peoples, an arrangement that was sanctioned by the Portuguese Crown which attempted to limit
slaving activities in the Congo kingdom to those directed at its neighbors.  However,  as the
century went on more and more slaves were taken from the Congo people themselves, leading to
a deterioration of relations with Portugal and cementing a pattern which was to last for
centuries.29  Again, extractive activities dominated the pattern of development (or lack thereof)
brought by the Portuguese.
On the East coast of Africa, the pattern was perhaps even more pronounced as the initial
30 See M. Newitt A History of Mozambique Indiana University Press, 1995, Chapter 1
“The Mozambique Channel Region in the Sixteenth Century”.
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goals of the Portuguese were two-fold:  First, they established forts at Sofala, Quelimane and
further north on the coast at Mombasa and Melindi in order to break into the pre-existing Indian
Ocean trade in gold and ivory originating from the Monomatapa kingdom in what is now
Zimbabwe.  Unable to conquer this powerful kingdom, the Portuguese established trading posts
on the coasts and up the Zambezi River at Sena and Tete in order to try to monopolize trade in
gold and ivory.  Military conquest of the sultanates of Zanzibar and Kilwa helped to cement the
Portuguese in a dominant role that was to last until the conflict with the Dutch of the first half of
the 1600's.  The second major goal of the Portuguese in their establishment of East African forts
was to provide way stations for ships on the way to India, the Spice Islands and Japan.  Indeed,
this was specifically ordered by the royal court in launching fleets to this area at the end of the
15th and beginning of the 16th centuries.30
Dutch Disease analysis, in addition to predicting that colonial development will be
focused narrowly on extractive activities, also predicts that those areas which were not directly
involved in generating foreign exchange are typically starved of any investment or development
at all.  Worse, they suffer a drain of manpower and resources as these are drawn off to support
the higher return activities which provide the revenue stream which fuels the syndrome.
The history of Portuguese occupation in Mozambique bears this out.   The “development”
of non-extractive economy in Mozambique was an afterthought at best.  The Portuguese royal
court gave grants of land called prazos which were conferred for the life of the grantee and two
generations of descendants.  Prazos rarely amounted to anything more than a fiefdom in which
the prazeiro used virtually unlimited power to requisition labor for working plantations or mines
or to levy a tax in kind from peasant farmers.  In essence, the existing local economy was entirely
unchanged except insofar as labor demands cut into labor available for other purposes.  Even in
this there were limits since unduly burdensome labor demands provoked migration to other areas
31  See M. Newitt A History of Mozambique Indiana University Press, 1995, 237-232.
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where demands were less.31
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VIII.  Conclusions
It seems clear that the framework of Dutch Disease economics is a useful way to look at
the macroeconomic development of not only modern day oil exporters such as Angola, but also
its early colonial period under the Portuguese.  One unfortunate implication is that it is possible
for such a syndrome, once established, to generate effects that can still be felt many years later. 
The evidence supports the idea that Portugal was suffering from many of the symptoms of Dutch
Disease from late in the 15th century until the beginning of the 19th and while loss of many
colonial possessions to the Dutch after the early 1600's cut back earnings substantially, the
stagnation of Portugal’s domestic economy continued long thereafter.  Indeed, the preoccupation
with finding riches abroad continued unabated, with attention diverted both to extractive
enterprises in Brazil, and to the slave trade, both of which provided substantial income to the
metropole but which did not directly promote development there.
It is also interesting to look at the Portuguese colonial enterprise through the lens of
modern macroeconomic analysis - What could have been done differently to improve economic
performance over the long term?  First, it must be emphasized that the whole notion of
“macroeconomic management” is a product of the twentieth century and was not even
conceivable in 16th century Portugal.  Rather, the only real “economic policies” of the
government (though they were not thought of this way) were first to ensure that money was not
debased - that is, that the royal mint was operated so as to guarantee the purity and weight of the
precious metals contained in each coin - and second, to decide the manner in which government
money from taxes or overseas adventures was spent.
Here it is possible to imagine some outcomes other than those which actually happened. 
Dutch Disease economics tells us that the key elements of dealing with a foreign exchange
inflow are first, how fast to spend the money and second, on what to spend it.  The history of the
Portuguese royal court makes it clear that their answer to the first question was the worst possible
from a macro point of view:  to spend the money as fast as it came in, and in fact even faster
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since not only was all of the money spent, but sizable debts were incurred as well.  The second
question again shows the royal court making “bad” policy choices - Money was spent on a
combination of imports and consumption goods for the nobility (castles, manor houses, servants,
luxury items, etc.).  The key common characteristic of all of these expenditures is their non-
productive nature.  No investment which could help the economy to grow or develop was
undertaken.
Turning to the economies of Lusophone Africa at the present time,  it would perhaps be
tempting to try to ascribe some of the current macroeconomic dislocations of e.g. Angola, a
country which suffers from Dutch Disease to an extreme rarely seen elsewhere, to its colonial
history as a dependency of a developing country which itself underwent similar dislocations. 
However, this would be going well beyond the evidence at hand, which points strongly to the
similarity in the problems caused by foreign exchange windfalls in the two countries but which
does not support any attribution of causality.  
Nevertheless, it is perhaps interesting to speculate somewhat on some vestiges of colonial
behavior that can be traced at least in part to the macro distortions that conditioned  relations
between Portugal and its colonies.  In particular, the development of Portugal and its merchant
class as essentially traders with little or no productive capacity meant that colonial elites (and
indeed metropolitan elites too) had a more parasitical relationship with both metropolitan and
colonial economies than would be the case in a more production oriented class.  This is certainly
true to a large extent as regards urban elites, but until the 20th century was even true to some
extent in rural areas as well.  As was noted above, even in the case of plantations such as the
Mozambican prazos, the colonial elite merely extracted surplus labor  from the local economy
rather than engaging in any widespread or in-depth development as occurred elsewhere in Africa
or the Americas.
One can speculate that this has left an unfortunate example for the newly emerging
commercial elites in Angola today.  There is little history in the country of truly entrepreneurial
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behavior in terms of production.  Rather, entrepreneurial energies are devoted to extracting rents
from trade in mineral or other already finished goods.  While it is certainly true that marketing
and distribution are key elements of any capitalist economy, an economy which is largely
composed of mineral production and traders who satisfy  the consumption that this revenue
generates is not one with a sustainable trajectory over the long run, but is perhaps unpleasantly
reminiscent of the behavior of the Portuguese elite during the colonial period.
In the final analysis, it must be acknowledged that even though the macroeconomic
arguments presented here are consistent with known data, and that some degree of Dutch Disease
almost certainly afflicted Portugal during the colonial period, this is not the only hypothesis
capable of explaining the evidence we see.  On the one hand, it is entirely plausible that Portugal,
once having come into an immense flow of wealth based on gold, spices and the slave trade, then
suffered from the symptoms of Dutch Disease and that this then led to the typical distortions and
sectoral pattern of stagnation associated with the syndrome.  
However, it is also plausible to argue that Portugal was a country with a poor natural
resource endowment in terms of agricultural land and readily usable transport routes and that
this, together with the country’s location on the periphery of the European continent can by itself
account for the stagnation and subsequent lack of development we have observed.  One could
push this argument still further and contend that it was precisely the poor prospects at home that
led Portugal to lead the way in search of riches overseas.  In this argument, the subsequent
distortions of Dutch Disease merely reinforced existing developmental tendencies.
Accordingly, we are left with a chicken-and-egg problem which is, as they always are,
insoluble.  It is undoubtedly true that Portugal suffered both from poor initial physical
endowments and from macro distortions stemming from huge inflows of riches from the
colonies.  We cannot assign priority of causality to either, but must content ourselves with saying
that both are part of the overall picture, and while this is perhaps less than satisfying to the
academic desire for rigorous proof of cause and effect, it is nevertheless a step forward toward an
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accurate understanding of the historical and economic processes at work.
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Table 1.  Estimates of Gold Exports from Southeast Africa 
Gold Exports
Contemporaneous 
Estimate
Arab period before 1500, two estimates of 1502 and 1506, respectively:
Thome Lopex, Sofala Exports
Diogo de Alcaçova, Sofala and Angoche exports
  8,500 kg
  7,650 kg
1508-09 annual average of exports via Sofala based on a 20-month period 34kg/62 kg1
1512-13 annual average based on eight months of Sofala exports         49 kg2
c. 1512-15 reports of Sofala factory         61 kg2
1518-19 reports of Sofala factory            4 kg3
1585 exports from Sofala and Quelimane        574 kg4
1591 exports from Sofala and Quelimane         716 kg1
1610 exports from Sofala and Quelimane          850 kg1
1667 exports from Sofala and Quelimane        1,488 kg1
1750 estimate of Francisco de Mello e Castra for Butua only 213 to 255 kg5
1758 estimate of Ignacio Caetano Xavier                525 kg5
1762 anonymous estimate                298 kg5
1806 estimate of A.N. de Barbosa                  51 kg5
1806 anonymous estimate for Quelimane only                  29 kg5
1  Axelson, South-East Africa, pp. 111-12.  These data were mainly reported in mithqal, the Arabic
measure of weight with a fair degree of local variation.  Axelson used the weight of the Sofala
mithqal at 4.83 gr. While Magalhães-Godinho and Randles used a mithqal at 4.25 gr.  Recent
scholarship on the 1506 exports by Magalhães-Godinho, Empire Portugais, pp. 270-271, suggests a
figure as high as 1,000 kg.
2  Axelson,  South-East Africa, pp. 123-26.
3  Axelson,  South-East Africa, p. 150.
4  Magalhães-Godinho, Empire Portugais, pp. 270-71
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Table 2.  Gold-coast gold received by the Lisbon  mint
Year Quality-Kilograms of 22 1/8 carat gold
1487 225
1488 225
1489 255
---- ---
1494 647
1495 647
1496 647
1497 371
1498 371
1599 371
1500 371
1501 280
---- ---
1504 438
1505 438
1506 438
---- ---
1511 321
1512 518
1513 414
1514 404
---- ---
1517 423
1518 484
---- ---
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1520 465
1521 429
---- ---
1523 300
1524 284
                       1525 (1st half-year) 206
1526 248
---- ---
1528 223
1529 211
            1530 (April) 150
1531 213
1532 680
---- ---
1534 272
---- ---
1540 392
---- ---
1543 349
1544 142
---- ---
1549 168
1550 155
1551 212
1552 123
1553 94
---- ---
1555 377
1556 242
30
---- ---
1560 144
1561 145
Source:  Magalhães-Godinho, L' économie de l'empire portugais, p. 216.  Before 1517, John Vogt,
Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469—1682 (Athens, Ga., University of Georgia Press, 1979),
pp. 217—218.  Based on contemporary estimates.  
Table 3.  Gold from Guinea Imported into 
Portugal on Private Account, 1494-1513
   Years
Quantity 
Annual Average Kilograms
1494-96   53
1497-98 182
1505-07 301
1509-10 372
1511-13 277
Source: Magalhães-Godinho, L’économie 
de l’empire portugais, p. 218.
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